DOWNSIDE LEGACY AT TWO DEGREES OF PRESIDENT CLINTON
SECTION: STATUS OF US INTELLIGENCE
SUBSECTION: PIERCING SECURITY
Revised 8/15/99

 

PIERCING SECURITY

Post-Gazette 1-23-99 Jack Kelly ".The odds are that an American city will be destroyed by a nuclear weapon within ten years, an architect of the U.N. weapons inspection program in Iraq predicted yesterday. Ambassador Robert Gallucci gave a chilling overview of the parlous state of nuclear proliferation at a luncheon sponsored by the World Affairs Council at the Duquesne Club...Gallucci believes the breakup of the Soviet Union and the breakdown of order in Russia and former Soviet republics has made rapid nuclear proliferation inevitable.. For years, whenever the CIA director was asked by a member of Congress how long it would take for Iran, Iraq, or North Korea to build a nuclear weapon, he would say, "about ten years," Gallucci said. "It takes about nine years to build up the facilities [required to produce fissile material] from scratch, and another year to build an implosion device." The correct answer now, Gallucci said, is: "I don't know, senator. They may have it already.".."

Times of India 2/18/99 Ramesh Chandran ".In 1995, American intelligence analysts came into the possession of a ``top secret'' Chinese nuclear weapons document from the late 80s and discovered something eerily familiar. According to a report in The Washington Post, these designs were ``uncomfortably similar'' to the US Trident missile warhead which then was amongst the latest in this country's strategic arsenals. And a weapon that had been designated ``top secret'' to boot. In the aftermath of that unsettling discovery, the FBI launched a series of counter-intelligence operations focussed on Chinese activity which continues even today. The heightened counter-espionage operations specifically targeted nuclear scientific centres such as the Los Alamos and Sandia National labs in New Mexico and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California. According to unnamed officials cited in the Post, US experts were analysing a string of nine Chinese nuclear tests between 1990 and 1995. And what ``tricks'' might Beijing have conceivably learnt? Miniaturising nuclear warheads.."

Kanwa Information Center 2/10/99 Kanwa News Freeper Jolly "...On February 2, the Far East Military Tribunal of Russia convicted a number of Russian and Chinese citizens of stealing and illegally selling the navigation system of Russia's SU27 fighter plane to China. Those who were involved in this espionage case included the former major of the Intelligence Bureau of Russia's Far East Military Region and the employees of the Far East Plane Plant that produced the SU27 for China. The above espionage group even extended its activities to the air force base and hired the low-ranking officers of the base to steal the navigation equipment and the other systems of the SU27 planes that now serve the Russian army...."

ST Recent events in the Middle East that are causing concerns: after the US was frustrated that Saudi Arabia announced no non-Saudis were involved in the Khobar Towers bombing, the Saudi's are leaking that there were foreigners involved - the Iraqi Vice President Taha Yasin Ramadan said the UN Security Counsel Resolution 833 concerning the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border "Legally, it is worthless." - Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal called on Iraq to honor Resolution 833, the principles of the Arab League and regional security agreements - the Saudi-Egyptian meeting took place to tackle the oil price crisis - Syrian Foreign Minister Faroug al-Shara met with Saudi and Egyptian counterparts on the stalled Middle East peace process - Egypt joined the Syrian-Iranian call for an "Arab NATO" - and UN inspectors claimed to have found nerve gas residue on destroyed Iraqi warheads.

7/8/98 New York Post Maggie Haberman "Russia is training troops to kill American leaders in the event of war - and staking out sites near New York City to plant nuclear "suitcase bombs," a former Soviet agent charges. The elite military squadrons would also destroy power stations and dams - and pinpoint the secret Air Force One landing sites as targets, former Russian military intelligence Col. Stanislav Lunev claims in a book that hit stores yesterday. Lunev, who says he's emerging after six years in the FBI's witness protection program, wrote the book to caution America about "the dirty tricks that can be played against her.". CIA and FBI officials wouldn't comment on the colonel or his claims."

RATFOR Systems Inc. 8/10/98 "The bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania was the major international event last week. .First, we do not know from direct evidence who was responsible. We assume that U.S. intelligence agencies also don't know who carried out the bombings, because had they known, we assume they would have prevented it. Second, if they uncovered the perpetrators in the few days since the bombings occurred, this would indicate that they had a great deal of information on hand already, and had failed to draw proper conclusions prior to the attack. Therefore, we assume that U.S. intelligence is also scrambling to figure out who was responsible. To put it another way, barring the unthinkable, which was that U.S. intelligence knew of the bombings but failed to stop them, it follows that the bombers were either clever enough to evade detection by the world's most sophisticated intelligence agencies, or that they represent a completely new element not on any watch list. Because it is a given that all significant terrorist threats are under constant scrutiny by U.S. intelligence, the bombers were either very new, very good, or both.."

Associated Press 7/3/98 Robert Burns ".In a private ceremony not announced by the CIA, retired spies John "Jack" T. Downey and Richard G. Fecteau received a prestigious Director's Medal for surviving two "dark decades" in Chinese prisons, the longest any CIA officers have been held captive abroad and lived to tell about it..."

New York Times 3/1/99 David Sanger "…Federal agents in California quietly arrested a Chinese citizen last week and charged him with trying to obtain a component vital to missile guidance systems. Officials said the arrest shed light on what many in Washington say is an effort by China to smuggle U.S. technology to improve the accuracy of its weapons. The Customs Service has yet to make a public announcement of the arrest of the man, Yao Yi, but federal officials and a criminal complaint filed in U.S. District Court in Boston say Yao tried to buy fiber-optic gyroscopes from a Massachusetts defense contractor. After the State Department refused to approve the deal, Yao dealt with another Boston company, which promised to help get the gyroscopes out of the United States. But that company was a dummy corporation set up as part of a sting operation by the Customs Service…. One federal official said that using this kind of gyroscope for a railroad project "would be like flying an F-14 to the grocery store." The arrest of Yao, who is believed to be 33 years old, came only hours after the Clinton administration, in an unrelated case, decided to prevent Hughes Electronics from exporting to China a $450 million communications satellite, ordered by a Singapore consortium with links to officers of the People's Liberation Army…. In the gyroscope case, a man identified by authorities as an associate of Yao -- Collin Xu, a Canadian citizen of Chinese origin -- was arrested two weeks ago in Boston after he allegedly took delivery of the fiber-optic gyroscopes -- all but one of which was a dummy -- and he is being held without bail….Two such applications were filed in May 1998, one listing the end user as ZheJiang University in China, and another listing the final user as Changsha Rail University in Hunan province. The applications were immediately denied by the State Department, which noted that China is a "prohibited destination" for the gyroscopes. In August, a new order was received by the Massachusetts company for nearly identical equipment, listing a new company as the purchaser: Micro Techland, in Montreal. An exemption to the State Department licensing rules permits the shipment of some types of equipment without a license to Canadian firms, for use in Canada. …"

WorldNetDaily.com 3/1/99 David M. Bresnahan "…A former member of U.S. Special Forces, who has also been involved in many intelligence operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, FBI, Internal revenue Service and others, is concerned about the threats and how the military might respond. "Last year in the February time frame, we had two teams of special operators in Afghanistan who were right on top of Osama Bin Laden. We could have taken him out any time we were given the word, but the president would not allow it," the source, speaking on condition of anonymity, told WorldNetDaily. "He didn't have the guts, or the will, or the reason to do it. Then he pulls this stunt sending those missiles over there," he complained. The Special Forces source believes the U.S. attacks in August 1998 on what President Clinton called known terrorist facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan were a major mistake. The U.S. informed the Pakistan government of plans to fire missiles through their air space. The source says that mistake tipped off Bin Laden. "The guy who sits on the right hand of the Pakistani president is the head of Pakistani intelligence who has on his right hand Osama Bin Laden. I mean that was the dumbest thing. "The whole thing has been a debacle. It's destroying our military," explained the source…."

7/1/98 John McCaslin Washington Times "The U.S. Army recently looked into who came calling the most to its Web site, and it certainly was not prospective recruits. "It was not the 82nd Airborne Division, it was not the Air Force, it was not the Navy, it was not the Marines," said Rep. Jim Gibbons, Nevada Republican who sits on the national security and select intelligence committees. "It was the communist Chinese," he revealed. "That is right, the United States Army Web site is most often visted by the People's Liberation Army." ."

WorldNetDaily.com 3/1/99 David M. Bresnahan "…The threat of a terrorist strike within the U.S. is very real, and weakness because of Y2K (perceived or real) will provide the opportunity many different forces may be looking for. Bin Laden is known to be planning strategic attacks that may come at the start of the new year. Sam Cohen, one of the architects of the neutron bomb, is now retired and has been sounding the word of warning for many years. He claims that terrorists could carry a small nuclear device into populated areas and detonate it with no warning. A former Russian intelligence agency official also warned that the U.S. is in danger of nuclear attack from "suitcase bombs" in the hands of terrorists. Col. Stanislav Lunev was kept from the press and the public, and concealed under a black shroud when he was brought secretly to meet with the House National Security Committee Aug. 4, 1998. Lunev, once a Russian spy, is now living in the U.S. under protection as a defector. He claims Russia had the small nuclear devices described by Cohen. He said it was his job to devise a plan of attack against the U.S. using the hand-carried bombs. Lunev says over 80 of the bombs are now missing. It is believed the devices were sold on the black market to a terrorist organization. "There's no doubt in my mind that they have been sold to a terrorist with a big bank account," said Cohen. "There's no doubt in my mind that the warheads have been around in the U.S." Cohen stated that he believes terrorists have the bombs and are stationed in many parts of America just waiting for the orders to detonate them…."

WorldnetDaily 3/2/99 Charles Smith "…One fact remains above the sex, sordid lies and dangerous phone calls; the White House was penetrated by Chinese Army agents. COSTIND Col. Lui met with Bill Clinton in the White House after donating money through Johnny Chung. The Chinese Army engaged in the most successful espionage effort of the twentieth century. Of course, they picked an easy target, Bill Clinton…. Defense experts are already tracing the vast array of advanced U.S. military technology sold to China in the missile arsenals of Iraq, Iran and North Korea. In Feb. 1999, the repercussions of the Chinagate scandal shot-down $500 million worth of satellites for communist China. The cancellation of the HUGHES sale to Asia Pacific Mobile Telephone (APMT) is a victory for western national security. APMT, the buyer of the Hughes satellites, is reported to be half owned by COSTIND, the same Chinese Army unit that penetrated the White House. According to the Defense Dept., the Hughes satellites were equipped with a sophisticated 40 foot antenna that could intercept U.S. military communications. The APMT satellites sales also included secure, encrypted, voice and data communications…."

Chattanooga Free Press 3/02/99 Editorial Freeper newsman "…The United States takes too soft a view of the form of treason involved when our citizens sell our military secrets to foreign nations. David Sheldon Boone, 46, a former National Security Agency intelligence analyst, has been sentenced to 24 years in prison -- do you think he'll serve that long? -- for selling top secret documents related to tactical nuclear weapons to the former Soviet KGB for $60,000…."

Electronic Telegraph http://www.telegraph.co.uk 3/04/99 Hugo Gurdon Hugh Davies Freeper A Whitewater Researcher "… EXCERPTS: "MOSSAD, the Israeli intelligence agency, taped...Clinton's phone sex sessions with Monica Lewinsky and used them to prevent the FBI investigating a Tel Aviv mole inside the White House, according to a new book...the book claims Mr Clinton's illicit fling compromised American security, and the Israeli agent - codenamed Mega - is still in the White House....Gordon Thomas, author of Gideon's Spies - the Secret History of the Mossad, says a senior Israeli intelligence officer explicitly told him that the spy agency had recordings of the President and Miss Lewinsky talking erotically on the telephone between the White House and her home in the Watergate building...the Israelis let the FBI know about the tapes. In his report to Congress, Kenneth Starr, the independent counsel, suggests that Mr Clinton was aware of the phone tapping...Mossad could not bug the White House, which is electronically secure, so when it received a tip-off about the Clinton-Lewinsky telephone fling, it tapped her home phone instead..."

OIC Report Narrative Section VI SubSection E Paragraph 4 Freeper DoughtyOne "…According to Ms. Lewinsky, she and the President had a lengthy conversation that day. He told her that he suspected that a foreign embassy (he did not specify which one) was tapping his telephones, and he proposed cover stories. If ever questioned, she should say that the two of them were just friends. If anyone ever asked about their phone sex, she should say that they knew their calls were being monitored all along, and the phone sex was just a put-on. (456) 456. Lewinsky 07/30/98 at 16…."

Drudge Report/ABC News 3/5/99 Barbara Starr "…But in an interview with ABCNEWS, Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre, who oversees all Pentagon computer security matters, confirmed the attacks have occurred over the last several months and called them ³a major concern.² ³This is an ongoing law enforcement and intelligence matter,² said Hamre, who last month briefed the House Armed Services Committee on the attacks in a classified session…. Officials believe some of the most sophisticated attacks are coming from Russia. Federal investigators are detecting probes and attacks on U.S. military research and technology systems ‹ including the nuclear weapons laboratories run by the Department of Energy. What is not clear, however, is whether the attacks are coming directly from Russia or whether the probes are coming from other countries that are simply routing through Russian computer addresses to disguise their origin…."

New York Post 3/7/99 Niles Lathem Freeper Plummz "…The United Nations' delegates lounge is the Rick's Cafe of the 1990s. . . . Not long ago, the U.S. shared top-secret information about its spy satellite system during a U.N. Security Council debate and inadvertently exposed a weakness in its capabilities. Intelligence analysts believe India used that information to deceive the U.S. intelligence community last year when it conducted a surprise nuclear-weapons test. . . . Sources said Somali warlord Mohammed Fariq Aidid learned the details of a planned U.S. operation to capture him thanks to a leak in the office of U.N. peacekeeping forces in New York. . . . U.S. intelligence agencies strongly suspect the leak came from an agent for a NATO ally that had a different strategy for stabilizing Somalia. . . . What has yet to emerge, U.S. officials say, is the extent to which the Iraqis infiltrated the same program at U.N. headquarters here - giving Hussein advance knowledge about the sites arms inspectors were planning…"

Reuters [OL] 3/6/99 Laurence McQuillan "… ``Currently there is an ongoing investigation to determine if there was criminal conduct and we continue to assess the implications for national security,'' said White House National Security Council spokesman David Leavy. According to other administration sources, federal agents as recently as this week questioned a suspect who may have been involved in stealing top secret documents from the National Laboratory in Los Alamos, New Mexico, and passing them to Beijing…."

ABCNEWS.COM 3/5/99 Barbera Starr "…The Pentagon’s military computer systems are being subjected to ongoing, sophisticated and organized cyber-attacks, officials there tell ABCNEWS…. The investigation is looking at a pattern of attacks that has not been seen before. Officials tell ABCNEWS there are several matters under investigation, and it is not clear to what extent the cyber-attacks are all linked….Officials believe some of the most sophisticated attacks are coming from Russia. Federal investigators are detecting probes and attacks on U.S. military research and technology systems — including the nuclear weapons laboratories run by the Department of Energy…. The U.S. National Counterintelligence Center, or NACIC, which monitors espionage activities worldwide, has been tracking the threats posed by lack of official security systems on Russian computer networks for some time. A September 1998 NACIC report noted Kremlin statements that foreign secret services were regularly penetrating Russian computer networks. U.S. officials believe, however, that there may be an even more disturbing problem: Foreign government hackers may be getting help from within the U.S. government. We are increasingly concerned about those who have legitimate access to our networks — the trusted insider," …"

Reuters 3/7/99 "…Senate Intelligence Committee chairman Richard Shelby Sunday criticised the Clinton administration for moving too slowly to tighten security after a major leak of nuclear secrets to China was discovered in 1997. "We've been pushing, we've been prodding the administration to do more, to tighten up security,'' the Alabama Republican said on the NBC program "Meet the Press.'' "I think they're beginning to but it's been a long time,'' Shelby said. "They waited a long time. They could have done more. They could have done more immediately ... It will damage, if it hasn't already damaged our national security in a big, big way.'' Shelby said Congress would hold hearings as soon as possible to look into the leak of secrets to China in the mid-1980s and the administration's subsequent investigation. "The attitude of lax security is going to do more damage to our national security than what we've seen in these newspaper articles,'' Shelby said. …"

"NBC NEWS’ MEET THE PRESS." 3/7/99 Freeper JustPiper "…Good morning, sir. SEN. SHELBY: Good morning, Tim. MR. RUSSERT: Senator Shelby, Paul Redman, the former CIA spy hunter, says that this case is worse than Aldrich Ames, the spy who sold secrets to the Soviet Union, and as bad as the Rosenbergs, when the Rosenbergs stole nuclear secrets before World War II. If, in fact, these charges, allegations, are true, how serious is this? SEN. SHELBY: If, in fact, to use your words, that these allegations are true, it’s very, very serious. It’s probably the worst breach that we’ve had in many, many years. MR. RUSSERT: Do you have any evidence of other Chinese espionage going on over the last few years? SEN. SHELBY: Well, Tim, in America today there’s a lot of lax attitudes toward national security, in our labs everywhere and other places, too. A lot of people believe since the demise of the Soviet Union that we don’t have threats anymore, which is wrong. I believe, myself—as a matter of fact, I know as chairman of the committee—that the attitude of too much openness is not paying off for us. It’s paying off for countries like China and others in the world who are continuing to try to get our secrets and obviously are getting some…..MR. RUSSERT: Now, the chief of intelligence for the Department of Energy says that he was ordered last year not to tell Congress about this because there was concern that critics would use this information to criticize the Clinton administration policy of engagement towards China. SEN. SHELBY: If that is true, this would be very bad, bad news and bad policy, moreover. I hope that this is not true, but we will have the gentleman before the committee and we’ll have him under oath. We’ll find out what’s going on here as far as the exact step-by-step allocations, but I can tell you, Tim, the attitude of lax security is going to do more damage to our national security than what we’ve seen in these newspaper articles and on your TV this morning…"

New York Times 3/8/99 Erik Eckholm "…The Foreign Minister, Tang Jiaxuan, gave the first official response to accusations of nuclear espionage Sunday at a previously scheduled news conference. The assertions, circulating within the American Government, were reported in The New York Times on Saturday…Today Tang said, "I think the report by The New York Times was irresponsible and unfounded." The espionage assertions, Tang noted, followed other recent accusations that China has gained military technologies through commercial satellite transactions. "There are always some people trying to obstruct normal trade relations between the United States and China, including the export of high-technology items," he said. "This will not be beneficial to the interests of the United States." …"

NY Times OpEd 3/8/99 William Safire "…Throughout the 1996 Clinton campaign for President, China's agents of influence had the run of the White House as they raised millions for the Clinton campaign. Chinese military intelligence officials were waved in without clearance. U.S. executives contributed megabucks as they lobbied for easier approval of sales of sensitive technology to Beijing. In the midst of this -- in April of 1996 -- a Department of Energy official informed President Clinton's deputy national security adviser, Samuel Berger, (1) that China had probably stolen our secrets of making warheads small enough to enable long-range missiles to pack multiple nuclear punches, and (2) that the suspected spy was still at work in the Los Alamos laboratory in New Mexico. Mr. Berger, who sat in on most of the political meetings with Clinton's Asian fund-raisers, did nothing. The internal security division of the Department of Justice apparently did not ask a court for wiretap authority under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. At Reno Justice, investigating any Chinese penetration is a no-no Over one year later, after news stories and columns about Clinton's "Asian connection" had stimulated law enforcement officials and a Senate committee to bestir themselves, F.B.I. Director Louis Freeh and Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet went to the office of Energy Secretary Federico Peña. "Louis and George read him the riot act," a meeting participant tells me, "about lax security at Los Alamos." But nothing happened for a year and a half. Senator Fred Thompson's hearings on the Asian connection were politicized and truncated by John Glenn and Tom Daschle. Not until late 1998, when a bipartisan House select committee under co-chairmen Chris Cox and Norman Dicks began asking questions about Chinese espionage, did a new Energy Secretary begin to lock the barn door…"

Houston Chronicle 3/13/99 James Brooke NY Times "…Within two weeks, Peter Lee, a Taiwan-born physicist who once worked at the nuclear weapons laboratory here, will complete a one-year sentence to a halfway house in California. … Peter Lee's involvement with China dates back to 1981, federal prosecutors say, when he began a correspondence with Chinese scientists that mounted to more than 600 letters and e-mail messages by 1997, the year of his arrest. After his arrest, he pleaded guilty to passing classified national defense information to Chinese scientists on a visit to Beijing in 1985. He also pleaded guilty to lying to a government agency after he described on a security form a May 1997 visit to China as a pleasure trip. In reality, Lee, then a researcher for a U.S. military contractor, met extensively with Chinese scientists. "U.S. intelligence analysis indicates that the data provided by Dr. Lee was of significant material assistance to China in their nuclear weapons development program," the Department of Energy said in a presentencing statement submitted last year to Federal District Judge Terry J. Hatter in Los Angeles…. "Lee was a little ahead of his time," said Christopher Paine of the Natural Resources Defense Council…."

NEWSMAX.COM 3/14/99 Andrea Widener "…Since it opened in 1952, Livermore lab has had several espionage incidents, though none as widely publicized as the New Mexico researcher fired this week for allegedly passing secrets to the Chinese in the mid-1980s. The Los Alamos story has dredged up a 10-year-old Lawrence Livermore case, which drew top billing on CBS Evening News and a mention in the Washington Post…. In the revived Livermore case, Chinese scientists allegedly used stolen secrets to build and conduct a 1988 test of a neutron bomb, which would kill soldiers with radiation without destroying nearby buildings. After a two-year FBI investigation, called Tiger Trap, a lab scientist resigned. "The only thing I would say about the incident in the 1980s at Livermore is that as far as we know it was false and it was a 10-year-old story," Bellaurdo said…. None of the reported espionage incidents at the weapons laboratories -- which also includes Sandia's labs in California and New Mexico -- involve foreign visitors stealing secrets. All of the people who allegedly revealed secrets were naturalized American citizens…. "

MSNBC Website 3/16/99 Robert Windrem "….THE DOCUMENTS, obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by intelligence historian Jeffrey Richelson for NBC News, revealed new details about the extent of Chinese penetration into the nuclear research labs. They also portray a clear concern as early as 1991 about Chinese spying, both at the national weapons labs and when scientists presented papers at international seminars in China…. Most of the documents, published between 1991 and 1995, were unclassified, although some were classified "for official use only," the lowest level of classification…. E-mail and the threat it posed to the DOE’s security regulations was of particular concern. For instance, an Office of Counter Intelligence bulletin produced in 1994 notes "e-mail’s versatility and simplicity can contribute to undermining DOE’s ability to protect sensitive and proprietary information ... in many cases, the government exercises little or no control over email, and some employees use it to discuss sensitive and proprietary information." Specifically, in 1994, the bulletin noted that some lab employees receiving requests for information from sensitive countries have responded "instantaneously" to such inquiries "rather than follow established guidelines."… Another bulletin, from 1993, discussed the possible use of telephones at Los Alamos lab "to pass classified, sensitive information ... the situation at the laboratory in question places DOE in the potentially awkward position of paying to facilitate the possible illegal transfer or its technology." … The bulletin added that many of the calls involved computer modems….. ". In 1993, the counter-intelligence bulletin reported on four incidents where scientists travelling to China reported suspicious activities: "A traveler’s luggage was lost for five days upon arrival at his location [in China.] …. "A traveler believes that his hotel room was entered while he was out and that personal items were tampered with….. "A traveler returned to his hotel room to find that his tape play had been advanced at least 15 minutes from where he knew he stopped the tape. The tape in question was a language tape. "A traveler believes he was spotted and assessed. He believes [his hotel] in Beijing is set aside from Western businessmen attending conferences and the rooms may be bugged." ….The next year, 1994, the office took advantage of CIA spy Aldrich Ames’ arrest to warn its staff that Russian spying pales in comparison to Chinese. "Some counter-intelligence experts say that for every Aldrich Ames, there could be 10 to 100 Bin Wu’s," referring to a Chinese spy convicted of stealing U.S. technology…."

Wall Street Journal 3/17/99 James Lilley a former CIA station chief and ambassador to China "…In 1987, Chinese United Nations personnel employed Chinese-American businessmen in New Jersey to obtain TOW2 antitank missiles, F-14 fighter plane blueprints, and air-to-air missile information. These were to be smuggled out as refrigerator parts. Four of the businessmen were arrested, and one of the diplomats was forced to flee the U.S. In 1992, Ben Wu, an agent of the Ministry of State Security stationed in Norfolk, Va., tried to smuggle second-generation night vision equipment to China. He is currently in a Pennsylvania jail. In 1985, Larry Wu Tai-chin, an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency, was arrested after working 41 years for Chinese intelligence. Mr. Wu was caught by a brilliant CIA penetration operation of the MSS. If this is discouraging, the Clinton administration's handling of the latest scandal is even more so. The president claimed that he "moved quickly and decisively" when he learned of the security breach. Yet it took 11/2 years for the Energy Department to act on the FBI's recommendation to reinstate background checks for visitors to Los Alamos, and Mr. Lee retained his security clearance for over a year after he became the prime suspect. Administration officials also withheld information from Congress for fear that the disclosure could adversely affect its policy toward China…. "


AP 3/18/99 "…Nuclear weapons secrets could leak to China inadvertently, FBI Director Louis Freeh says, and the Energy Department is taking steps to make sure that a casual e-mail or fax doesn't give away sensitive military secrets…..Freeh told a House hearing Wednesday that the FBI still is trying to determine whether a leak to China of weapons information from Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico occurred through the actual passing of documents or simply from viewing and memorizing information that was seen or read. Freeh said he could not rule out information getting into Chinese hands by ways in which a person ``is not intending to transmit secret information.'' ….."

Capitol Hill Blue 3/20/99 "… At his first press conference in a year, President Clinton claimed he knew of no other espionage at U.S. nuclear weapons labs. Top security officials, however, say otherwise and they said the President also knows better…. "Los Alamos isn't the only place this has happened," one said, "and the President knows that. In closed-door briefings on Capitol Hill over the past week, key lawmakers were told of the expanding investigations, including one case of suspected espionage at the Argonne National Laboratory, which has facilities in Illinois and Idaho, the officials said. Congressional sources said the Argonne probe involves the possible disclosure to China of neutron bomb technology by an Asian-American scientist. The congressional officials said the Argonne case is believed to have begun before Clinton took office, but investigators are checking into whether the loss of sensitive data may have continued into his presidency…. One senior congressional official said the unidentified Argonne employee has been under clandestine monitoring as counterintelligence officials try to develop their suspicions into a solid case. The Argonne lab, oldest of the nation's nuclear research facilities, is primarily devoted to pure scientific research. But weapons labs such as Sandia and Los Alamos conduct weapons-related work at Argonne facilities….."

Newsweek 3/29/99 John Barry Gregory Vistica "…The news was worse than the CIA had imagined. Last week, in response to recent reports that China may have stolen nuclear secrets from Los Alamos and other U.S. weapons labs, President Clinton ordered a preliminary "damage assessment" to determine just how much Beijing knows about the American nuclear program…. NEWSWEEK has learned that when the CIA showed the material to a team of top nuclear-weapons experts, they "practically fainted." Chinese scientists routinely used phrases, descriptions and concepts that came straight out of U.S. weapons labs. "The Chinese penetration is total," says an official close to the investigation. "They are deep, deep into the labs' black programs." U.S. officials believe that China may have acquired design information over the last two decades about seven U.S. nuclear warheads, including the neutron bomb created in the early 1970s. They may also have stolen secrets about U.S. efforts to devise a nuclear weapon tailored to create an electromagnetic pulse—a man-made lightning bolt that would short out anything in an enemy nation that uses electricity…. They do not believe it was a foreign visitor to the labs, or leaks through U.S. allies—none had access to the closely guarded material. Which leaves an unsettling possibility: "This was done by American citizens," says one source close to the investigation. Yet officials say only a handful of top insiders at the labs and the Energy Department even knew about some of the secret programs, which has left the close-knit nuclear community wondering if a colleague could have done the unthinkable…"

Fox News 3/24/99 "…Los Alamos National Laboratory chose Wen Ho Lee, a scientist who was already under investigation as a suspected spy for China, to lead a sensitive nuclear weapons program in 1997, several senior government officials told The New York Times Wednesday. Lee then hired a postdoctoral researcher who was a Chinese citizen and who has since disappeared, intelligence and law-enforcement officials told the newspaper…. Although the FBI had said a wiretap on Lee would enable the agency to keep a close watch on the computer expert, the bureau never received approval from the Justice Department for electronic monitoring, officials told the newspaper. In September 1997, FBI Director Louis Freeh told senior Energy Department officials that the bureau did not have enough evidence to arrest Lee and there was no longer any investigative reason to keep him in a sensitive position, law-enforcement officials told the newspaper…."

AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE 3/23/99 Freeper Thanatos "…Beijing has reportedly seized two American cruise missiles which failed to detonate in last year's attack by Washington on suspected terrorist bases in Afghanistan. United States intelligence agencies were worried that the mainland might try to copy the weapons' guidance and avionics technology, Newsweek magazine reported. The cruise missiles were reportedly obtained by Beijing after US air strikes against sites linked to alleged terrorist Osama bin Laden in August…."

Investor's Business Daily 4/12/99 Paul Sperry "…Thanks to recent spying at U.S. labs, China may now have the ability to tip its nuclear missiles with several warheads. And it may have the know-how to perfect a neutron bomb, which can kill troops and knock out electronics without destroying buildings. More, China may have snatched the secrets to making a so-called electromagnetic gun, which shoots a pulse that can short computers and power grids. These are the reported leaks. More may come to light later this month when a select House panel releases declassified parts of a report on Chinese espionage. The bulk of the report is said to focus on lab leaks - parts the White House is trying to block. Not only is China stealing U.S. nuclear secrets, it's aiding the weapons programs of nuclear wannabes like Pakistan and Iran. In essence, a nuclear arms race has started in South Asia and the U.S. is sitting on the sidelines - unable to test weapons and, therefore, hamstrung in its efforts to design new ones…

Wall Street Journal 4/8/99 David Cloud "...The Clinton administration received fragmentary intelligence reports in 1996 that China had acquired information from a U.S. source on producing a neutron bomb, a senior administration official said. An investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Department of Energy has failed to turn up a suspect or much additional information about the source of the security breach, other than that Beijing acquired the information in 1995. The neutron bomb gives off high levels of radiation and was developed by the U.S. in the 1970s as a weapon against the Soviet Union. The White House was briefed by the Energy Department, which oversees nuclear-weapons security, in 1996 and 1997 on the intelligence suggesting that China had received neutron-bomb information. Because there were few specifics about the source, no additional security steps were taken, the administration official said. "There was no way of knowing where the information might have come from," the official said.... "

Associated Press 4/22/99 H Josef Hebert "...Despite security concerns, scientists at federal weapons labs must be allowed freedom to exchange ideas within the scientific community, the director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory said Thursday..... But John C. Browne, who became director at Los Alamos in 1997, said his scientists "know how to draw the line'' when talking to outsiders and should be given some leeway. "It is a campus. It's a campus behind a fence,'' said Browne during a hour-long meeting with reporters. "We can't just put everybody behind a fence and lock them up and let them do their job.'' .... He said he's still not convinced that a Los Alamos computer scientist, who has been the target of an FBI investigation for three years, gave the Chinese the W88 information. The scientist has not been charged, but was fired for security violations earlier this year. "It's still not clear from what I read whether our guy was the guy that did this,'' said Browne..... "We've got to demonstrate to people that the lab ... can be trusted. The thing that hits me most is a feeling that the country no longer trusts Los Alamos,'' said Browne...."

AP 4/22/99 "...China is a few years away from fielding improved nuclear weapons with the help of classified information gained by spying on the United States, according to a U.S. intelligence damage assessment of Chinese espionage. In addition to gaining improved weaponry, including lightweight warheads for use on multiple-warhead ICBMs, China may also be more likely to spread its older weapons technology to other countries as its own weaponry improves, a U.S. intelligence team concluded. In a long-awaited damage assessment, administration officials disclosed Wednesday for the first time that China gathered classified information not just on the W-88 warhead and the neutron bomb but on ``several'' modern U.S. warheads - particularly ``re-entry vehicles,'' the nuclear weapons mounted on multiple-warhead rockets. The assessment made clear that China's espionage efforts were likely to continue.....But a senior intelligence official speaking on condition of anonymity said the multi-agency assessment team predicted in its classified report that China would field improved weapons within a few years. ...Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Richard Shelby said the briefing Wednesday made it clear that Chinese spying continued into the Clinton administration. Clinton has said he knows of no espionage breaches at the weapons labs during his tenure. ``It confirms my worst fears,'' Shelby, R-Ala., said of the damage assessment. ``We made it easy for the Chinese because of weak security at our national labs. ... We took too long to find out what was going on and we still don't know how deep and wide the problem is.'' ...."

Washington Times 4/22/99 Bill Gertz and Nancy Roman "...The official said details of the compromise were outlined in a Chinese document that a Chinese official gave to the CIA in 1995. "Some of that information could only have been obtained from espionage," the official said at a background briefing on Chinese spying at U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories. "That's why we feel strongly about making the statement about espionage. . . .The damage assessment was ordered in March by CIA Director George J. Tenet based on the recommendations of a special House committee headed by Rep. Christopher Cox, California Republican. Its report, submitted to Congress Jan. 1, is classified, and Mr. Cox has been working since January to get the administration to declassify it. He and the administration have been wrangling over which sections of the 700-page report can be made public. Sources close to the negotiations over the report said if the White House does not agree to release the report before the committee's authority expires, parts of it approved by the administration will be released anyway.....

Washington Times 4/22/99 Bill Gertz and Nancy Roman "...According to a one-page summary of the key findings of the damage assessment, titled "Implications of China's Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Information and the Development of Future Chinese Weapons":

* "China obtained at least design information on several modern U.S. nuclear re-entry vehicles, including the Trident II (W-88)." Re-entry vehicles are ballistic missile warheads.

* "China also obtained information on a variety of U.S. weapon-design concepts and weaponization features, including those of the neutron bomb."

* The full extent of weapon details stolen by Chinese spies is not known, and it is not known whether China stole weapon design documents or blueprints.

* China probably used the warhead design information to build similar warheads, rather than seeking to replicate U.S. warheads.

* The nuclear warhead data "probably accelerated its program to develop future nuclear weapons" and "allowed China to focus successfully down critical paths and avoid less promising approaches to nuclear weapons design."...."

Chinatimes 5/3/99 AFP "....Top US officials were warned last autumn that China posed an "acute intelligence threat" to US nuclear weapons programs but waited until this spring to act, The New York Times reported Sunday. A report prepared by US counterintelligence officials, warning that outsiders were "constantly" penetrating the United States' nuclear research labs, elaborated on longstanding concerns about the vulnerability of these labs to espionage, the Times said. The report was distributed last November to officials at the highest levels of government, including Defense Secretary William Cohen, Energy Secretary Bill Richardson, National Security Adviser Sandy Berger and Attorney General Janet Reno...."

World in Review 4/99 Dr. John Coleman "...Intelligence sources indicate that China has infiltrated its most reliable agents, especially selected from crack units of the People's Liberation Army's "Quanto Bodui" unit which consists of 200,000 specially trained men. Although totally trained in espionage, these agents are playing a different role, somewhat unorthodox in style. However, they still come under the control of Qingbaouoju ~military intelligence~ headed by general Ji Shengde. The idea of having mobile units especially trained in martial arts, demolition, special weapons, was taken from GRI ~Russian military intelligence~. The first units began their training in 1982 at the Beijing Police School. Kung fu is taught, and the individual spy is told to have a great reverence for it.... Their nick-name "chen diyu" translated into English means, "fish in deep water." After a course in business management, and business etiquette, the Spetznas are sent from Hong Kong to Toronto, Vancouver and Mexico City, where they pose as refugees from mainland China who fled from Hong Kong after China took over the former British colony. After infiltrating into the U.S. they put on a smooth businessman veneer, and set themselves up in communities where they blend in. They are careful to avoid any locations where organizad crime is established. They engage in espionage, and mental preparation for the time when they may have to be engaged in sabotage in the event of hostilities between China and America. By all accounts, they are among the best spies China has in the United States. Although we cannot be sure of it, "chen diyu" units may have been engaged in nuclear secrets spying at US centers such as Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore. Qingbaouoju had reason to believe that security was lax at these places while John Deutch was CIA chief. It is believed that some "deep fish" came as visitors.... The Chinese scientist Wen Ho Lee, who worked at Livermore, actually traveled to China to deliver a paper at a professional conference, believed to have been arranged by general ji Shengde. As required by the Energy epartment regulations, Lee was duty-bound to report contacts with Chinese scientists, but apparently his failure to do so, went unnoticed by the Energy Depaartment and the CIA. Most significantly, Keith Furz of the GAO, told a subcommittee of the House national security committee that many of the problems encountered in 1988, WHICH INCLUDED LIVERMORE BEING UNABLE TO ACCOUNT FOR 10,000 MISSING DOCUMENTS), were still in evidence in 1991 and onwards...."

The Age 5/17/99 PAUL DALEY CANBERRA and JENNIFER HEWETT "... The Federal Government has launched a top-level inquiry into the security of Australia's spy networks after the United States charged a rookie intelligence expert from Melbourne with trying to sell US defence secrets to another country. Jean Philippe Wispelaere, 28, appeared in a US court yesterday accused of selling the secrets to an FBI agent posing as a spy from another country...... It is alleged that Mr Wispelaere received $US120,000 ($A180,000) from the FBI agent in exchange for hundreds of classified US documents, which he stole while working for Australia's Defence Intelligence Organisation in Canberra for six months until last January. He was arrested in Washington on Saturday after a joint operation by the FBI, the Australian Federal Police and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation...... The sources said that some of the stolen material related to the procurement of biological, chemical, nuclear and ballistic missiles by Asian countries and America's theatre missile defence program in North Asia. While neither America nor Australia would name the country to which Mr Wispelaere allegedly tried to sell the material, sources said he was believed to have approached both the Pakistan and Indian embassies in Bangkok within a week of his sudden resignation from the DIO in January.... The FBI affidavit against him claims that he provided top secret documents that could cause ``serious and exceptionally grave damage to US national security interests if disclosed to unauthorised entities''.... His attempt to sell the material backfired when the targeted country informed the US.....He made the first approach to the Bangkok embassy on 18 January, less than a week after resigning from the DIO. The FBI affidavit alleges that he handed 713 classified documents to an undercover agent in Bangkok on 3 April....."

The Washington Times/via Drudge 5/21/99 Bill Gertz "...A Russian intelligence officer working undercover at the United Nations was caught spying on the United States and was allowed to leave the country quietly this month, The Washington Times has learned. Senior U.S. officials were particularly upset by what they called Russia's "aggressive" spying. It was the second time in six months that FBI agents caught an SVR officer spying in the United States, a sign that Moscow is intensifying intelligence activities here. The officer for Russia's foreign intelligence service, SVR, was arrested by FBI agents late last month during a secret counterintelligence operation after he obtained a classified U.S. government document from an informant, said administration officials familiar with the case. The officer was not declared "persona non grata" and forced to leave the country, the procedure normally used to expel spies posing as diplomats and who are immune from prosecution, the officials said. Instead, the matter was handled by the U.S. and Russian governments without notifying the United Nations. Because the officer, whose identity was not revealed, was working at the Russian Mission to the United Nations in New York, the State Department allowed him to leave the country quietly on May 1, the officials said. "He was caught with conclusive evidence," said one law enforcement official...... "These activities show that the Russians are continuing aggressive intelligence activities against the United States," said one official close to the case. The last time the Clinton administration publicly expelled a Russian intelligence officer was February 1994. Alexander Iosifovich Lysenko, Russia's senior spy in the United States was ordered out of the country after the arrest of Aldrich Hazen Ames, a CIA officer who worked secretly for Moscow. The secrecy surrounding the State Department handling of the two recent spy cases contrasts sharply with another recent spy case. A former Australian intelligence official was indicted Wednesday on a charge of attempted espionage after an FBI sting. Jean-Philippe Wispelaere was an Australian military intelligence official from July 1998 until his resignation Jan. 13. He is accused with selling secret and top-secret U.S. defense documents to undercover FBI agents during the past two months...."

Investor's Business Daily 5/26/99 "...As the Cox congressional report shows, China went on its quest for military technology as far back as the late 1970s. They stole design information on a warhead useful in a thermonuclear weapon, or a neutron bomb. And much of the advanced warhead data were stolen from the U.S. in the 1980s, under Republican presidents -which Clinton mouthpieces were quick to point out. But the report notes, ''significant secrets are known to have been stolen as recently as the mid-1990s.'' It adds: ''The (People's Republic of China) stole, possibly from a U.S. national weapons laboratory, classified thermonuclear weapons information that cannot be identified in this unclassified report.'' ..."

RNC 5/25/99 Freeper cd jones "...The Chairman of the Republican National Committee this afternoon urged Senate Minority Leader Thomas Daschle (D-SD) to ``read the Cox Committee Report before commenting on it.'' He charged Daschle with ``glaring errors'' in his remarks to Capitol Hill reporters this afternoon. ``If Senator Daschle had read the Cox Committee Report, he'd know that the Communist Chinese espionage began in the late 1970s -- during the Carter administration -- not in 1982 as Senator Daschle falsely said today,'' Nicholson said. ``Had Senator Daschle taken the time to read the Cox Committee Report, he'd also know that it was the Clinton administration -- not the Carter, Reagan or Bush administrations -- that was made aware of this breathtaking program of Communist Chinese espionage....."

Capitol Hill Blue 5/25/99 "... The report said that in the late 1990s, China obtained ``electromagnetic weapons technology'' that could be used to attack satellites and missiles, improved detection techniques that could be used against submarines, and ``research technology that if taken to successful conclusion could be used to attack U.S. satellites and submarines.'' Administration officials have questioned how much use any of those technologies are to the Chinese. And while the report was adopted unanimously, some of the four Democrats on the panel, have suggested the report often uses ``worst case'' assumptions..... "

www.wired.com 5/25/99 Declan McCullagh "... A new congressional report claiming widespread technological espionage by China will thwart any changes to US encryption rules in the near future, a top White House official predicted Tuesday. The conclusions of the 872-page report will probably result in legislators tightening export controls instead of relaxing them, White House Chief of Staff John Podesta said....."

5/25/99 Bill Gertz Washington Times "...The report says China: Stole design information on the United States' most advanced thermonuclear weapons that could be incorporated in the next generation of Chinese ICBMs. Transferred ballistic missile technology to Iran, Pakistan, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Libya and other countries. Acquired some 600 supercomputers, some of which are being used in violation of U.S. export laws to develop nuclear arms. Stole U.S. missile guidance technology with direct applications for China's ballistic missiles, including short-range missiles and ICBMs. Has more than 3,000 corporations in the United States, some with links to the Chinese military, its intelligence service, or with technology targeting and acquisition roles. Stole U.S. missile guidance technology that has direct applicability to its ballistic missiles and rockets. The stolen guidance technology is used on a variety of U.S. missiles and military aircraft....."

5/26/99 US. Newswire "....The internationally syndicated newsmagazine show "American Investigator" has uncovered a clandestine arms network involving former U.N. ambassadors, used to obtain dangerous U.S. munitions. Airing on May 28, the show reveals each step of the illegal operation. "American Investigator" has penetrated and exposed a covert operation to acquire U.S. military equipment by Libya. During an investigation spanning eighteen months, an "American Investigator" reporter went undercover several times, posing as an arms supplier and using hidden video and audio equipment to catch Libyan operatives attempting to buy military equipment found on the U.S. Munitions List. The U.S. Munitions List is comprised of sensitive technology and equipment related to defense and national security that require an export license to be shipped to any nation. Libya, currently listed as a rogue nation by the U.S. State Department, cannot qualify for such a license. Analysis and interviews with experts such as Yossef Bodansky, Director of the U.S. House of Representatives Task Force on Terrorism, explain that Libya is illegally acquiring and using similar equipment to build an extensive complex for manufacturing weapons of mass destruction...."

Sacramento Bee 5/26/99 Michael Doyle "...California's Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory was targeted, penetrated and exploited by Chinese nuclear spying efforts, a long-awaited congressional report released Tuesday concludes. China acquired classified information about four nuclear warheads designed at the top-secret lab. In addition, the report says, a contract scientist at the lab admitted giving the Chinese crucial information about lasers and anti-submarine warfare, and the lab's high-performance computers were squarely in the espionage crosshairs. "It is exceptionally likely that penetration of our U.S. national weapons laboratories continues to this very day," said Rep. Christopher Cox, the Newport Beach Republican who chaired the special nine-member House investigating committee..... Peter Lee was a Taiwan-born, naturalized U.S. citizen who worked for TRW Inc., a contractor at Lawrence Livermore, for about 17 years. The report notes that, in six "adversarial interviews" with the FBI, Lee admitted giving China research from Lawrence Livermore about detecting submarines under water. Lee admitted that in May 1997, he gave a lecture in Beijing in which he sketched out the physics involved in the joint U.S.-British research. He told Chinese scientists how to improve their ability to track submarines, and when he was done, he carefully tore "to shreds" the information he presented. The information was so sensitive that the Defense Department didn't want it used in his subsequent prosecution. In December 1997, Lee pleaded guilty to giving the Chinese other information about creating miniature nuclear explosions. He was sentenced to 12 months in a halfway house, 3,000 hours of community service and a $20,000 fine. In other cases, China tried tapping Lawrence Livermore through numerous visits made by scientists. At least twice this decade, the report states, scientists from the China Academy of Engineering Physics sought to collect intelligence from the U.S. labs. Between 1993 and 1996, a previous government study noted, 1,434 Chinese scientists visited the Lawrence Livermore, Sandia or Los Alamos lab. In turn, when Lawrence Livermore scientists have visited China, investigators say, Chinese officials have peppered them with technical questions, "sometimes after a banquet at which substantial amounts of alcohol have been consumed." ..."

Fox News 5/27/99 Freeper thewildthing "....Carl Cameron reports two national labs...Argonne and Sandia...have been penetrated since 1993 and ongoing investigations are underway as indictaed by unidentified FBI sources ..."

WorldNetDaily 5/27/99 J.R. Nyquist "...Seventeen major espionage cases were brought into the limelight between 1984 and '85 alone. Consequently, the year 1985 became "the Year of the Spy." Among the more spectacular cases of the 1980s: 1) Edward Lee Howard, a CIA employee, fled to the Soviet Union after his espionage was discovered; 2) The infamous Walker spy ring consisted of Navy Warrant Officer John Walker, his brother Arthur Walker (a retired naval officer), and Jerry Whitworth (Navy radioman). The Walker spy ring went undetected for 17 years; 3) Glenn Souther, a Navy satellite photography expert, is believed to have stolen the Navy's nuclear war plan. He successfully escaped to the Soviet Union in 1986 where he was given the rank of major in the KGB.... In December of 1984, then-FBI Director William H. Webster stated, "We have more people charged with espionage right now than ever before in our history. ..." The spies we caught in the 1980s were military and intelligence personnel. At the time, nobody was looking at the American business community, or at our politicians. We know that politicians around the world have been recruited and blackmailed by the Chinese and Russian intelligence services. Can we honestly assume that our country has been immune to this sort of penetration?..."

Washington Post Staff Writers 5/28/99 Page A093 "...If Chinese spies really have stolen secrets about the design of the most sophisticated U.S. thermonuclear warheads, why would they tell the CIA? .....A former CIA station chief in Seoul, Gregg said his best guess is that the Chinese haven't been as "diabolically clever," and the United States has not been as "monumentally stupid," as the Cox committee suggests. Gregg theorized that the document contained "degraded information" that the Chinese were deliberately passing back to the CIA as part of an intelligence cat-and-mouse game to show that the Chinese knew the CIA had fed them misinformation. Houston T. Hawkins, a former Defense Intelligence Agency nuclear weapons expert who works as a top intelligence official at Los Alamos National Laboratory, cites no less an authority than the Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu and wonders whether the Cox committee has fallen right into a Chinese trap. Borrowing a page from Sun Tzu's fifth-century classic "The Art of War," Hawkins said, the Chinese could have been trying to sow turmoil in a rival's ranks by triggering a spy hunt. Triggering such suspicion, he theorized, would have served another Chinese purpose as well, helping stem the tide of top Chinese nuclear physicists to the U.S. labs after graduation from U.S. universities. "They've accomplished these two goals--whether that's what they intended to do or not, and it is all caused by this document turned over by this double agent," he said. "Are the Chinese sophisticated enough to do this? They've been practicing espionage for 2,000 years." ....Former U.S. ambassador to China James A. Lilley, who served for years as a senior CIA officer, said that he questions the reliability of the document, which was dated 1988 and passed to the CIA in an as-yet undisclosed foreign embassy in 1995. The agent who delivered the document later returned to China. ....Paul Redmond, the former head of CIA counterintelligence who helped catch traitor Aldrich H. Ames, said he can't believe the Chinese would have included the warhead design information if they really thought it was valuable. What most likely happened, Redmond said, is that China passed the references to U.S. warhead designs--perhaps to build up the double agent's credibility--without realizing how sensitive they would be deemed by U.S. intelligence and, ultimately, the Cox committee. "There were a lot of these cases during the Cold War," Redmond said, "where you could never figures out what [the Warsaw Pact countries] were doing." ..."

Associated Press 5/30/99 Jim Abrams "...For the first time, Energy Secretary Bill Richardson on Sunday said he would fire department officials for failing to act on signs China was stealing secrets from a U.S. nuclear weapons lab. Dismissals and demotions could come as early as this week, after Richardson receives an internal report on security lapses at the Los Alamos lab in New Mexico that may have contributed to China's thefts of U.S. nuclear secrets. "There were communications breakdowns. There were incompetent acts, security was not considered important,'' Richardson said on NBC's "Meet the Press.'' On "Fox News Sunday,'' he cited "individuals at the Department of Energy and the labs that, in my judgment, did not do their jobs.'' .....Richardson also stressed that the Energy counterintelligence has already put in place 85 percent of the measures recommended to stop future attempts at espionage....Cox disagreed with that assessment, saying that since the people who have penetrated the labs over many years have not been apprehended, "we have to presume they are still there.'' ..."

The Pioneer 5/31/99 Agencies "... On a day in 1995, a Chinese defector walked into the U S embassy with boxes of secret Chinese documents for the CIA. Buried among the stacks of papers were 20 pages that would reverberate at the highest levels of America's Intelligence agencies and lead eventually to the Chinese espionage controversy.....What makes the case even more bizarre was the discovery later that the "defector" actually was a double agent for China's top intelligence agency..... Mr Cox suggested three theories: ---China may have released the dated document to mask the true source of the information or when it was obtained because the date 1988 might be misleading. ---The sensitive pages might have been included by mistake among thousands of pages provided by the double agent. ---China may have wanted to advertise that it had design information about America's most sophisticated warhead as intimidation against Taiwan. .... "

The Washington Times 5/16/99, pp C1 Bill Gertz "....Chinese hackers have attacked U.S. government information systems, including the White House network, in response to the errant bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia, according to an FBI report. An e-mail copy of the report, "China Cyber Activity," was obtained by The Washington Times. The report said Chinese-origin attacks on White House, State Department and other government computer systems could be copied by sympathizers in the United States. "Much of this activity traces back to Chinese addresses, and much of the reporting of this activity comes from official Chinese news sources," the report said....China is one of several nations working on the capability to knock

out vital computer, information and electronic systems.... The report did not say whether the Chinese government was behind the activities. However, Stephen Bryen, a former Pentagon export control official, said the Chinese maintain tight control over Internet service providers and it is unlikely the cyber attacks could be launched by individuals without the approval of the government..."

Reuters 5/31/99 "... Bulgarian custom officers have arrested a Turkish man for trying to smuggle a container with 10 grams (0.35 ounces) of uranium-235 across Bulgaria's checkpoint at the Danube port of Rousse, a spokesman said on Sunday. Ivan Kutevski said the suspect, a 35-year-old Turkish citizen of Kurdish origin named as Yusian Haniffi, was travelling to Moldova from Turkey. He was detained early on Saturday morning. Kutevski said the found material had been ``a very serious quantity'' and estimated its value at between $500,000 and $1.0 million...."

INVESTOR'S BUSINESS DAILY 6/9/99 Paul Sperry "...Yet the scandal is anything but seamless. In fact, it bunches up hard around the Clinton administration..... The declassified version of the House report identifies 11 cases of Chinese espionage since the late 1970s. Eight took place during President Clinton's years in office. Two of the three prior cases were first learned in 1995 and 1997. In other words, the vast majority of the leaks over the past 20 years have sprung on Clinton's watch and nearly all the old leaks have shown up then. That's not all. The House report doesn't disclose the full extent of Chinese espionage in the Clinton years. Citing ''national security'' reasons, the White House censored roughly 375 pages, including several recent cases. At least 24 times, the declassified version of the report states: ''The Clinton administration has determined further information cannot be made public.'' Left out are details about Chinese espionage that took place in the ''mid-1990s'' or ''late 1990s.'' ''Some of the most significant thefts occurred in the last four years,'' said Rep. Chris Cox, R-Calif., who headed the House panel...."

6/14/99 AP H Josef Hebert "...But the [Rudman] report provided hints of a number of previously undisclosed espionage tidbits. Among them: --Sometime in 1995 or later, ``an illegal telephone wiretap was discovered'' at an unnamed weapons lab. ``The employee who installed it confessed, but was not prosecuted by the government.'' --In the early 1980s, evidence was discovered that conversations at an unnamed weapons lab were being monitored. No further details were provided. --A DOE report in 1994 compared some computer systems at the labs to ``automatic teller machines (that allow) unauthorized withdrawals at our nation's expense.''..."

Washington Post 6/30/99 Walter Pincus Vernon Loeb "...An internal Energy Department investigation has uncovered critical weaknesses in computer security, protection of nuclear materials and reaction capability of the guard force at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, according to congressional and administrative sources. .....The team--which included active and retired FBI, CIA, Secret Service and military personnel--probed the Livermore lab's response to external security threats, such as attacks by terrorists or computer hackers, and determined it was not prepared for them....Sources said the Energy Department investigators did limited performance testing of Livermore's contract guard force and determined it could not handle some physical assaults on the facility. In addition, the team said the guards' response times to other events were far slower than needed. The investigation showed that foreign nationals residing in sensitive countries abroad and doing non-weapons work for Livermore have had remote dial-up access to the nuclear laboratory's main, unclassified computer. .....The investigative team, which Richardson has described in testimony as his "junkyard dogs," also discovered some Livermore buildings that contained stored nuclear materials and parts did not meet Energy Department security standards. .....Richardson's internal probe expands the focus to include weaknesses in physical and cyber-security systems. Livermore and other facilities hold tons of plutonium and other nuclear bomb materials that past security reviews have found vulnerable to terrorist attack. ...."

Washington Post 6/30/99 Walter Pincus Vernon Loeb "...Edward J. McCallum, a retired Army Green Beret lieutenant colonel who served as DOE's director of safeguards and security until he was placed on paid administrative leave two months ago, said in an interview yesterday that Energy Department security forces are still inadequate. There are 4,000 security personnel for 50 facilities. "The major dozen or so facilities are well under strength; they're running 25 percent overtime on average." While DOE SWAT teams used to protect nuclear facilities from terrorist attacks have been reduced by 50 percent since 1992, McCallum said, there has been increase of 30 percent in the amount of nuclear materials for which the department is responsible. McCallum, who has been openly critical of the way the administration has handled DOE security, said he had been using Army Green Berets and Navy SEALS to help train department security personnel and to help pinpoint security vulnerabilities at the nation's nuclear facilities. He said that unlike himself, Glenn Podonsky, a longtime DOE employee who headed the new investigation called for by Richardson, could get the results of his investigations "to the secretary. I couldn't get it past the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security, an office formed in 1993 that separated us from the secretary's office." Podonsky, who headed the new investigation, said in an interview that when he went to the Energy Department to do inspections and evaluations in the late 1980s, "I would get mild attention from assistant secretaries and the labs would push back on recommendations." Then-Energy Secretary Hazel R. O'Leary cut back on his budget and emphasized health and safety inspections, other sources said. Besides physical security at Energy Department facilities, McCallum said, the department must also rectify serious cyber-security problems. "The classified systems have never been penetrated," McCallum said. "But the unclassified, sensitive computer systems have been, hundreds of times or more." ...."

Sen. James M. Inhofe Republican from Oklahoma. "...First, let us begin with a simple fact: Sixteen of the seventeen most significant major technology breaches revealed in the Cox Report were first discovered after 1994. With the lone exception of the breach of the initial design information of the W-70 warhead (the so-called neutron bomb)-which was first discovered during the Carter Administration-everything else was first discovered during the Clinton Administration. Let me repeat-sixteen of the seventeen most significant major technology breaches revealed in the Cox Report were first discovered during the Clinton Administration. Those who tell you otherwise are willfully lying to you...."

Sen. James M. Inhofe Republican from Oklahoma. "...Second, of the remaining sixteen technology breaches, one definitely occurred during the Reagan Administration-the W-88 Trident D-5. Seven occurred sometime before 1995, though it is unclear exactly when. And eight occurred-without question-during the Clinton Administration.

Sen. James M. Inhofe Republican from Oklahoma. "...The seven that occurred before 1995 included breaches of information on all of the currently deployed nuclear warheads in the U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile arsenal: the W-56 Minuteman II; the W-62 Minuteman III; the W-76 Trident C-4; the W-78 Minuteman Mark 12A; and the W-87 Peacekeeper. In addition, there was the breach of classified information on reentry vehicles, the heat shield that protects warheads as they reenter the earth's atmosphere when delivered by long-range ballistic missiles.

Let me repeat that all of these technology breaches were first discovered in 1995.

Sen. James M. Inhofe Republican from Oklahoma. "...Next, we move to the other eight major technology breaches revealed in the Cox Report. All of these were not only first discovered during the Clinton Administration, they also happened on Clinton's watch:

1. The transfer of the so-called Legacy Codes containing data on 50 years of U.S. nuclear weapons development including over 1,000 nuclear tests;

2. The sale and diversion to military purposes of hundreds of high-performance computers enabling China to enhance its development of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and advanced military aviation equipment;

3. The theft of nuclear warhead simulation technology enhancing China's ability to perfect miniature nuclear warheads without actual testing;

4. The theft of advanced electromagnetic weapons technology useful in the development of anti-satellite and anti-missile systems;

5. The transfer of missile nose cone technology enabling China to substantially improve the reliability of its intercontinental ballistic missiles;

6 .The transfer of missile-guidance technology (by President Clinton to China) enabling China to substantially improve the accuracy of its ballistic missiles-these same missiles that are targeting US cities;

7. The theft of space-based radar technology giving China the ability to detect our previously undetectable submerged submarines; and

8. The theft of some other "classified thermonuclear weapons information," which "the Clinton Administration" (not the Cox committee) "has determined . . . cannot be made public."

Sunday Times of London 7/25/99 Matthew Campbell "…AMERICAN officials believe Russia may have stolen some of the nation's most sensitive military secrets, including weapons guidance systems and naval intelligence codes, in a concerted espionage offensive that investigators have called operation Moonlight Maze. The intelligence heist, that could cause damage to America in excess of that caused by Chinese espionage in nuclear laboratories, involved computer hacking over the past six months. This was so sophisticated and well co-ordinated that security experts trying to build ramparts against further incursions believe America may be losing the world's first "cyber war". Investigators suspect Russia is behind the series of "hits" against American computer systems since January. In one case, a technician trying to track a computer intruder watched in amazement as a secret document from a naval facility was "hijacked" to Moscow from under his nose….. Besides military computer systems, private research and development institutes have been plundered in the same operation. Such institutes are reluctant to discuss losses, which experts claim may amount to hundreds of millions of dollars….. Dozens of infiltrations ensued at other military facilities and even at the Pentagon in Washington. When research laboratories also reported incursions using the internet technique, officials realised that a "cyber invasion" was under way….. Even top secret military installations whose expertise is intelligence security have been breached. At the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (Spawar), a unit in San Diego, California, that specialises in safeguarding naval intelligence codes, Ron Broersma, an engineer, was alerted to the problem when a computer print job took an unusually long time…."

ChinaOnline News 7/29/99 William J McMahon "...The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is currently investigating the possibility that an American official crossed the line in being "too obliging with the Chinese government," a reliable source told ChinaOnline on Thursday. The source also said that the official in question is not an ethnic Chinese-American, something unusual in Chinese espionage cases....

Bin Wu, a Chinese double agent, was sentence to 10 years in prison in 1993 for attempting to transfer night-vision technology to China. In 1987, four Chinese businessmen were caught trying to sell TOW2 antitank missiles, blueprints for F-14 fighter plane, and air-to-air missile information. In 1986, Larry Wu-tai, a CIA translator, was convicted for spying for China for more than 30 years. In the same year, Israel was discovered to have sold U.S. defense technology to China that lead to the development of China's J-10 fighter bomber. Da Chuan Zheng, a Hong Kong businessman, was arrested in 1984 for trying to buy advanced high tech equipment for China. Da reportedly sold over US$25 million in U.S. radar and surveillance technology to China.... "

The Washington Times 8/7/99 Jim Keary "...A Department of State private security guard breached security by taking a woman he met over the internet into the office of Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and was not fired, a former guard supervisor told The Washington Times. Former Sgt. Calvin McIlway, 35, reported the November 1998 incident to his superiors at Inter-Con Security Systems Inc. and said the guard was allowed to resign -- rather than being charged and fired -- so that he could return to a job in the military. Mr. McIlway said the man, who also was a guard sergeant, had no business going into Mrs. Albright's office -- especially with a woman he barely knew. "This woman was not screened and she went into a high-security area. That was a serious breach of security," Mr. McIlway said. "..."

Atlanta Constitution 8/15/99 Rebecca Carr "…Federal investigators say Wang, son of a former Chinese vice president, formed at least a half-dozen companies in the Atlanta area with just 20 em ployees. Still, investigators say some of these companies bought, sold and in at least one case smuggled sophisticated weapons, funneled money to suspicious offshore bank accounts, and bought up land across the country….. "There is little doubt that Wang Jun was in this country to acquire sensitive technology," said Rep. Christopher Cox (R-Calif.), who headed a Congressional investigation into Chinese espionage….a former Chinese naval intelligence officer who ran Wang's Atlanta operations from offices on East Paces Ferry Road was indicted in 1996 for his alleged role in smuggling 2,000 AK-47s into this country. …The Wang associate, Robert Ma, remains a fugitive and is believed to be in China. Federal investigators suspect he had been tipped off that the indictments were coming. Then there's the treasure chest of arms sale profits stemming from Wang's Atlanta operations that mysteriously ended up in the Cayman Islands, Bermuda and the British West Indies, according to internal company records, court documents and interviews with former employees …."

Atlanta Constitution 8/15/99 Rebecca Carr "…. As the head of Poly, Wang reports directly to the so-called Staff Department of PLA, which oversees China's military intelligence. Wang also runs China International Trust & Investment Corp., a powerful company with interests in industry, finance and trade. Federal investigators believe both companies took part in a plan to station workers at companies throughout the United States to gather sensitive information that would be helpful to the military. Cox and other federal investigators estimate there are as many as 3,000 such "front" companies in the United States……F. Michael Maloof, chief of technology security operations at the Defense Department's U.S. Threat Reduction Agency, has been investigating Wang's activities for more than 18 months. He has no doubt about what Wang has been up to. "Wang Jun's operations are part of an overall Chinese system that is integrated to target and acquire militarily critical technologies," Maloof said….. Congressional committees have requested his appearance to answer campaign fund-raising and espionage allegations for the past two years. They have little hope he will appear. "This guy is bad news," said Rep. Bob Barr (R-Ga.), who sits on the House panel investigating campaign fund-raising misdeeds. "The fact that he has been able to operate with impunity is very disturbing. This fellow has ties that go directly to the Communist Party in Beijing. He is right there, smack in the middle of the campaign finance scandal and (involved with) U.S. corporations that are in the middle of the spy scandal. Apparently this comes as a surprise to our law enforcement officials, and that's a problem. It's outrageous." …"

Atlanta Constitution 8/15/99 Rebecca Carr "…Wang's enterprises eventually stretched across the United States, but they began in Atlanta in 1987 as PTK International Inc., a joint venture with a Smyrna company, Keng Firearms Specialty Inc. Two other companies controlled completely by Wang --- Dynasty Holding Co. and Poly USA Inc. --- soon followed. Four additional companies were incorporated in Atlanta, but never conducted any kind of business. Most of the companies listed the same officers and the same address on East Paces Ferry Road. Wang's companies in Atlanta devoted themselves mostly to importing guns from China and reselling them to dozens of American distributors. But Dynasty bought a lot of commercial property across the country. …. All of the companies were dissolved by the summer of 1996 soon after Ma's gun smuggling indictment, according to Collins, who remains on good terms with his former Chinese employer. ….After several years of discussions, Poly and Keng signed an agreement in Beijing in 1986. Poly would export from China AK-47 assault rifles and SKS semi-automatic rifles to Keng Firearms, which would sell the guns to PTK, the joint venture between Wang's Poly and Keng in Atlanta. PTK then would sell to American distributors. …."

Atlanta Constitution 8/15/99 Rebecca Carr "…In Atlanta federal court, the Kengs and Poly tangled over shipments and legal issues involving their partnership. The court fight soon turned nasty, involving two of the city's biggest law firms --- Long, Aldridge & Norman representing Poly and Alston & Bird representing the Keng family. Court records show a flurry of unusual legal actions….. After much haggling with Poly, Stephenson and his partner, Peter Bassett, went to Beijing in the spring of 1991 to depose Ma and a handful of others. On the third day of their visit, the lawyers said they were accosted by three men at the top of the escalator at the China World Hotel. They warned: "We know who you are, where you are and what you are doing. Watch your step. Beijing is a small place." Stephenson and Bassett were so rattled that they immediately returned to their hotel room and called the U.S. embassy. No answer. They left and walked to the lounge of the Shangri-La Hotel, where they sat in a stunned daze for hours, thinking about what to do next. The men who had accosted them knew too much --- their names and businesses --- to be mere street thugs…..Stephenson and Bassett say their suspicions about the incident were confirmed when a year later they learned from the American Embassy in Beijing that a high-ranking Chinese official had --- the day before their arrival in China --- sent a letter to the embassy, objecting to their taking depositions of potential witnesses…. A few days later, Stephenson told Atlanta federal Judge Charles Moye in court documents that "individuals have been threatened with punishment in the event (Poly) learns of their involvement." He said it would be impossible to call future witnesses, some of them employees of Wang, because he feared that the Chinese government might "subject individuals in China to the danger of retribution." …."

Atlanta Constitution 8/15/99 Rebecca Carr "…Stephenson said Poly abruptly dropped its suit after he started tracing millions of dollars of Dynasty's money to a "mail drop" in the Cayman Islands. Much of that money, Stephenson alleged, accumulated in offshore accounts through an illegal "dual billing" practice to hide gun sale profits from China's Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations. "They were shipping money from Dynasty to an insurance company in the Cayman Islands, ostensibly for insurance premiums," Stephenson said. "We are talking about a mail slot in a bank. . . . They were expensing these premiums for tax purposes, so they didn't show their full income on their business activities here." …. "

Atlanta Constitution 8/15/99 Rebecca Carr "… And evidence of espionage continues to grow….. In 1988, Poly asked PTK officials to place a shipment of high-tech computer equipment in brown paper and ship it in unmarked wooden crates to China. Company documents indicate that company officials were asked to draft documents that would conceal the equipment, making it appear that it was actually radio equipment. Memos turned over to investigators show that Poly officials in Beijing wrote memos to Poly employees in Atlanta instructing them in Chinese to ship $19 million worth of militarily sensitive high-tech radar equipment through a state-owned shipping line….. "